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FEMINISM AND THE FALSE DICHOTOMY OF
VICTIMIZATION AND AGENCY*
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER7
During the last twenty years, feminist activists and lawyers have
attempted to transform societal understandings and to shape legal
definitions of several interrelated harms against women: woman-abuse,
rape, sexual harassment, and pornography. In each of these areas,
feminist redefinition of harm has been premised on a theoretical
framework of gender subordination in which women are primarily viewed
as victims.' However, as feminist work on these issues has developed,
tensions within feminism and conflicts among feminists have emerged
concerning women's victimization. 2 In this essay, I suggest that feminist
work has too often been shaped by an incomplete and static view of
women as either victims or agents, and argue that what I have previously
identified as the false dichotomy between women's victimization and
* © Copyright by Elizabeth M. Schneider 1993.
** Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. An earlier version of this essay was
presented at a panel on "Victim Feminism" at the Law and Society Association 1994
Annual Meeting. I am grateful to Martha Fineman, Tom Grunfeld, Susan N. Herman,
Minna Kotkin, Sylvia Law, Betty Levinson, Martha MeClusky, and Martha Minow for
materials, conversation and comments and to Suzanne Brackley and Stephanie Manes for
research assistance. A Brooklyn Law School Faculty Research Grant generously
supported my research and writing. This essay is part of a larger project on tensions
within feminist legal theory and practice.
1. This theoretical framework has been called "dominance feminism." "Dominance
feminism" is used "to describe that strand of feminist (legal) theory that locates gender
oppression in the sexualized domination of women and the eroticization of that
dominance through pornography and other aspects of popular culture.... Catharine
MacKinnon would probably be described as the primary-and most visible-exponent of
this theory" but there are a "range of feminists who have worked theoretically and, often
through political practice, to raise consciousness about male sexualization of and
aggression against women." Kathryn Abrams, Songs of Innocence and Experience:
Dominance Feminism in the University, 103 YALE L.J. 1533, 1549 (1994) (reviewing
KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING A]IFER (1993)).
2. For an historical perspective on feminist conflict on a variety of different issues
see generally, CONFucrs IN FEmINIM (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Keller eds., 1990),
Nadine Taub, Thoughts on Living and Moving Wth the Recurring Divide, 24 GA. L.
REV. 965 (1990). For more recent examples of conflict on the theme of victimization
and agency see infra note 26 and accompanying text; see also Tamar Lewin, Feminists
Wonder Ifit Was Progress to Become 'Victims,' N.Y. TiEs, May 10, 1992, § 4, at 6.
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women's agency is a central tension within feminism.' I briefly examine
themes of victimization and agency and the vacillation between these
extremes in feminist legal theory and practice generally, and situate the
pornography debate, the subject of this Symposium, within this larger
context.
I first explored the dichotomy between victimization and agency in
feminist legal work in a 1986 article examining women's self-defense
work and the problem of expert testimony on battering.4 This article
examined the theme of victimization as it had emerged in expert testimony
in homicide cases involving battered women who had killed their
assailants-testimony on what had become known as "battered woman
syndrome" 5-and raised serious questions about "battered woman
syndrome." 6 I suggested that although the development of expert
testimony on battering by feminist litigators had been important because
it described the common experiences of battered women, educated the
courts, and thus helped battered women in getting justice, it was also
problematic.7 Expert testimony that emphasized, or is understood to
emphasize, only the helplessness or victimization of battered women was
necessarily partial and incomplete because this testimony does not address
the crucial issue of the particular woman's action, or her agency-namely
how that battered woman acted to save her own life. Judges and juries
evaluating the self-defense claims of battered women who have killed their
batterers are looking at women who have been both victims and actors.
In spite of their victimization these women have mobilized their resources
to keep themselves and their children alive, and ultimately acted to protect
themselves. I suggested that this emphasis on victimization had the
3. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOIEN's RTS. L. REP. 195, 197,
220 (1986) [hereinafter Describing and Changing]; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on
Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 548 (1992) [hereinafter Particularity and
Generality].
4. See Describing and Changing, supra note 3, at 220.
5. Expert testimony on battering was developed to explain the common experiences
of, and the impact of, repeated abuse on battered women. "The goal was to assist the
jury, and the court in fairly evaluating the reasonableness of the battered women's action.
... [Elxpert testimony was predicated on an assumption that battered women's voices
would not be understood or were not strong enough to be heard in the courtroom." Id.
at 198. "In most of the cases in which expert testimony on battering has been presented,
the expert has testified concerning battered woman syndrome, a pattern of severe
physical and psychological abuse inflicted upon a woman by her mate." Id. at 202.
6. Id. at 216.
7. Id. at 221.
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potential to lock lawyers and judges into stereotypical thinking that may
prevent them from understanding the reasonableness of the individual
battered woman's act.' I argued that in order to present an appropriate
explanation of her act, defense lawyers must be sensitive to both
victimization and agency; the woman's action has to be put in the context
of her victimization. 9
My central point was that although an appreciation of women's
experiences as victims was necessary and important, an exclusive focus on
women's victimization was incomplete and limiting because it ignored
women's active efforts to protect themselves and their children, and to
mobilize their resources to survive. At the same time, I argued that an
exclusive focus on women's agency, reflected in the emphasis on why the
woman had not left the battering relationship, was shaped by liberal
visions of autonomy, individual action, and individual control and
mobility, which were equally unsatisfactory without the larger social
context of victimization. 0 I sought to explode the false and disabling
dichotomy between notions of victimization and agency in feminist theory
and practice." Concepts of women's victimization and agency are both
overly simplistic; both fail to take account of the oppression, struggle, and
resistance that women experience daily in their ongoing relationships.12
I concluded that:
[P]ortrayal of women as solely victims or agents is neither
accurate nor adequate to explain the complex realities of women's
lives. It is crucial for feminists and feminist legal theorists to
understand and explore the role of both victimization and agency
in women's lives, and to translate these understandings into the
theory and practice that we develop.13
I have continued to explore this theme of victimization and agency as
it has emerged in other dimensions of legal reform work on battered
women.14 The battered women's movement has begun to grapple with
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 222.
11. Id. at 221-22.
12. Id. at 220-21.
13. Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
14. See Particularity and Generality, supra note 3.
1993]
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the limitations of the concept of victim.15 The term "battered woman
survivor" is now used, and there is a developing literature that details the
active efforts of "battered woman survivors."16 Resource and advocacy
materials on battered women now emphasize the human strengths and
capacities of battered women who struggle to survive, protect themselves
and their children, and keep their families functioning. '7
Yet, the victimization/agency dichotomy persists and pervades legal
reform work for battered women. We can see this in the societal focus
on women having to leave the battering relationship, and in the problems
of battered women who are mothers. First, there is a common perception
that a battered woman should have left the violent relationship. The
question is always, "Why didn't she leave?" This view trivializes the
woman's victimization, the physical harm that she has suffered, and the
trauma that she has experienced; it also does not take account of the
complexity of the relationship, the social, psychological, and economic
factors that impeded her, and the risk of death that she faces in leaving. 8
The exclusive focus on a particular form of agency--exit-renders
invisible all the other active efforts that the woman may have made to
protect herself and her children. 9 Battered women who are mothers are
viewed as primarily responsible for the harms to which their children are
exposed, and their own victimization is often not understood;' they may
be denied custody of their children or have their parental rights terminated
15. See id. at 550. See also Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language:
The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398,
1428 (1992) (describing the different strategic characterizations of a battered woman in
an advocacy context as "victim" or "reasonable woman").
16. See Particularity and Generality, supra note 3, at 550 n.125 (citing to recent
materials that reflect the change in treatment of battered women).
17. See id.; see also EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATrERED
WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TRFATINo LEARNED HELPLESSNESS
(1988); LEE A. HOFF, BATrERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS (1990); JAN BERLINER
STATMAN, THE BATrERED WOMAN'S SURVIVAL GUIDE: BREAKING THE CYCLE 87-100
(1990).
18. See Particularity and Generality, supra note 3, at 557-59. Martha Mahoney has
described battered women's fear of "separation assault, the violent attacks batterers make
when women attempt to leave relationships." Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the
Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv.
1283, 1304 (1992).
19. See Mahoney, supra note 18, at 1303-04. Mahoney explains that if exit remains
a focal point, we will fail to examine a more important act of agency, staying, and the
tremendous "will, strength and determination" that may accompany such a decision. Id.
at 1304.
20. See Particularity and Generality, supra note 3, at 555-57.
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because they are viewed as passive in having failed to protect their
children from abuse when they may have made active efforts to do so.2
When I first considered the theme of victimization and agency in
feminist theory and practice, I saw parallels in feminist work on battering
and pornography.' I suggested that work on anti-pornography ordinances
developed by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin reflected a
similarly dangerous emphasis on the exclusivity of women's
victimization.' I perceived that these anti-pornography ordinances were
animated by a view of heterosexual sexuality as victimization that
dismissed women's participation and pleasure as sexual actors.' As the
anti-pornography movement has developed, this view of women as victims
has become only more pronounced.'
Today, the theme of feminism as victimization dominates popular
culture.' Despite feminist legal struggles on many diverse fronts in
21. See id.
22. See Describing and Changing, supra note 3, at 220-21.
23. See, e.g., Minneapolis, Minn., Ordinance (Dec. 30, 1983) (amending
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 139); Minneapolis, Minn.,
Ordinance (Dec. 30, 1983) (amending MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit.
7, ch. 141) (each passed twice by the city council, and vetoed each time by the mayor).
See also American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), afid,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986) (Indianapolis, Ind. ordinance
held unconstitutional).
24. See Describing and Changing, supra note 3, at 221 n.186.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 220-21; see also Lisa Duggan et al., False Promises: Feminist Anti-
Pornography Legislation in the U.S., 38 N.Y.L SCH. L. REv. 133 (1993); Carole S.
Vance, More Danger, More Pleasure: A Decade After the Barnard Sexuality Conference,
in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALrrY at xxii (Carole S. Vance
ed., 2d ed. 1992), reprinted in 38 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 289 (1993); Nadine Strossen,
A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099
(1993); Carlin Meyer, Sin, Sex and Women's Liberation: Against Suppressing Porn, 72
TEX. L. REV. 1097 (1994).
27. There has been an extraordinary amount of media attention to the theme of
feminism as victimization. See generally Sarah Crichton et al., Sexual Correctness: Has
It Gone Too Far? NEWSWEEK, Oct. 25, 1993; Lewin, supra note 2, at 6. Much of this
recent attention has been promoted by the publication of Katie Roiphe's The Morning
After (1993) and Naomi Wolf's Fire With Fire (1993), particularly since both authors are
highly mediagenic. In addition, Katie Roiphe has been given special attention by such
influential newspapers as The New York Tunes, which excerpted a portion of her book
as its Sunday Magazine cover story. See Katie Roiphe, Date Rape's Other Victim, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 13, 1993, § 6, at 26. The Tunes also devoted a Sunday Book Review cover
story to a review of The Morning After and has featured her in other articles. See
Wendy Kaminer, What is This Thing Called Rape?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1993, § 7
1993]
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recent years, anti-pornography work has predominantly shaped media
attention.' Recent public attention to the important issues of sexual
harassment initiated by the Anita Hill - Clarence Thomas hearings," and
"date rape"30 has also highlighted, women's claims of gender
(Book Review), at 1; see also Katie Roiphe, All the Rage, N.Y. TImls, Nov. 29, 1993,
at A17 (editorial about how Lorena Bobbitt's act of violence symbolizes the anger and
frustration of the women's movement which sometimes erupts in "unexamined rage");
Barbara Presley Nobel, At Lunch With Katie andAnneRoiphe: One Daughter's Rebellion
or Her Mother's bnprint?, N.Y. 7UM, Nov. 10, 1993, at C1 (interview with Katie
Roiphe and her mother, Anne Roiphe); Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, Divergent Views
of Rape as Violence and Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1993, at C15 (discussing Katie
Roiphe's views).
28. This is largely because the media has lionized Catharine MacKinnon as the
primary feminist legal thinker and spokeswoman. See, e.g., Fred Strebeigh, Defining
Law on the Feminist Frontier, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 28
(interviewing Catharine MacKinnon and tracing the development of her theories on
pornography). See also The First Amendment, Under Fire From the Left: Whose Free
Speech? A Discussion by Two Leading Authorities, Moderated by Anthony Lewis, N.Y.
TIMES, March 13, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 40 (featuring Catharine MacKinnon debating
Floyd Abrams, a prominent defender of the First Amendment, on the issue of
pornography).
29. See Hearings on the Confirmation of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court of
the United States Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991). At his Senate confirmation hearings, Clarence Thomas was accused of sexual
harassmentby Anita Hill, a former aide. See Joseph P. Kahn, Susan Faludi Lashes Back;
'Backlash'Author is Angry as Ever, But Heartened by a Renewed Fervorfor Feminism,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 13, 1992, at 57 (stating that the hearings "focused the country's
attention on sexual harassment in the workplace"); Deborah Sontag, The Changing Face
of Harassment, N.Y. Tmms, Nov. 2, 1992, at B3 (noting that the hearings "helped
redefine sexual harassment as a volatile issue").
30. "Date rape" or "acquaintance rape" has received tremendous national attention
because it is increasingly recognized as a common form of rape, and because of many
highly publicized cases such as those involving William Kennedy Smith and Mike Tyson
in which the rape victim and the accused had some prior relationship. In addition the
Antioch College "date rape" code has been the source of much discussion and humor.
Antioch College, a small liberal-arts school in Ohio, instituted a strict sexual-offense
policy in 1992 in response to a number of sexual assaults on campus. The code requires
students engaging in sexual relations to obtain their partner's consent for each individual
act of intimacy and sex. Although there are some who view the consent policy as a step
in the right direction, others, taking it to its literal extreme, have described it as reading
"like a Saturday Night Live routine." Indeed, Saturday Night Live has satirized the policy
in one of its sketches. See Jane Gross, Combating Rape on Canpus in a Class on Sexual
Consent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993, at 1; Saturday Night Live (NBC television
broadcast, Oct. 2, 1993). See also Jeff Giles & Stanley Holmes, There's a TiUne for
Talk, and a Thune for Action, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1994, at 54, 55 (mocking the policy
as "[reeking] of political correctness"); Jason Vest, The School That's Put Sex to the
[Vol. 38
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subordination, and has been heard as emphasizing women's experiences
of victimization. 31 Not suprisingly, we are now seeing a backlash against
women as victims. 2 These views have been fueled by two recent books,
Katie Roiphe's The Morning AfteP3 and Naomi Wolf's Fire With Fire,'
which attack "victim feminism"' and have received extraordinary media
attention.36
Test; At Antioch a Passionate Reaction to Consent Code, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1993,
at G1 (stating that the policy had become "something of a nationaljoke"). But see Eric
Fassin, Playing by the Antioch Rules, N.Y. 7IMES, Dec. 26, 1993, § 4, at 11 (suggesting
that even if the Antioch rules make people uncomfortable at first, it is more important
to wait and see if they help improve relationships between men and women, and that
such rules are necessary in the "absence of cultural consensus"); Ellen Goodman, Behind
the Sexual Liberation Struggle, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 1993, at 10 (describing the
policy as a positive effort "to rewrite the dialogue about sexual relations" and concluding
that the sexual "checklist" is not so much an "impediment to sex" as it is a "prerequisite
for a lifetime of mutual pleasure").
31. Both sexual harassment and "date rape" are the subjects of both Katie Roiphe
and Naomi Wolf s books. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text. But see Lewin,
supra note 2, at 6 (quoting Professor Martha Mahoney of the University of Miami Law
School saying "Anita Hill never said she was a victim or that she was terrorized. She
spoke as someone who had been trying to do her job and get on with her life. She talked
about her struggle and the context of her sLruggle. But what she was heard as, and
judged as, was someone claiming victim status because that's the only way we're heard
at all.").
32. See, e.g., Anna Quindlen, Vwtim and Valkyrie, N.Y. TmES, Mar. 16, 1994 at
A21:
There, has been a backlash against feminism, a backlash that teaches that there
has been too much emphasis on the belief, bad for women and men alike, that
to be a woman is to be beleaguered and under attack. Those who deride victim
feminism insist that the point of the women's movement is to make women feel
powerful, strong, in control of their own lives, and not to cast men as the
enemy. With this goal, we cannot disagree. But such Valkyrie feminism
coexists uneasily with the facts of our lives, lives in which their scars are the
price some women pay simply for being female.
Id.
33. KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS
(1993).
34. NAOMI WOLF, FIRE WrrH FIRE: THE NEW FEMALE POWER AND How IT WILL
CHANGE THE 21sT CENTURY 141 (1993) (noting the recent emergence of "victim
culture" critics, who have attacked feminists for focusing on women as mere victims).
35. See ROIPHE, supra note 33, at 51-112, 138-60; WOLF, supra note 34, at 135-42,
191-97.
36. See note 27, supra. See also Margaret Emery, Feminisrn Under Fire, TIME,
Sept. 20, 1993, at 86 (reviewing Katie Roiphe's The Morning Afier); Deirdre English,
Take Back the Fright, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 10, 1993, at 37 (reviewing The Morning
19931
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In both books the authors criticize feminist work on "date rape,"
sexual harassment, and pornography as "victim feminism" 37 and offer
"power feminism"-premised on women's individual agency, choice, and
exercise of responsibility-as the alternative. 38 Roiphe and Wolf argue
that feminist emphasis on victimization in these contexts reinforces sex-
stereotypical views of women as fragile and passive." But their
complaint of "victim feminism" and solution of "power feminism" are
simplistic in failing to grapple with the systematic nature of women's
subordination and women's active efforts to resist such subordination.
Regretfully, they also demonstrate a lack of compassion for women,
particularly women who are not in situations where they can assert "power
feminism."' Both books underscore the fundamental inadequacy of
focusing on either victimization or agency (reconceived as "victim
feminism" or "power feminism") to capture the complexity of struggle in
women's lives and highlight the way this false dichotomy leads to
problematic extremes.41
After); Linda Bird Francke, Woman the Conqueror, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 1993, § 7
(Book Review), at 9 (reviewing Naomi Wolf's Fire With Fire); bell hooks, Color Roiphe
Privileged, Says Black Feminist, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 27, 1993, Pt. 2, at 57 (reviewing
The Morning After); Michiko Kakutani, Helpful Hints for an Era of Practical Feminism,
N.Y. TIMs, Dec. 3, 1993, at C29 (reviewing Fire With Fire); Karen Lehrman, Fire
With Fire, NEw REPuBLIC, Mar. 14, 1994, at 40 (reviewing Fire With Fire); Adele M.
Stan, Women Warriors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, at A39 (Op-Ed); Cathy Young,
Women Writers Disagree on Rape, Porn and Vietimhood, S.F. EXAM., Jan. 18, 1994,
at A21. As of spring 1994 a computer search on the topic of victim feminism turned up
more that 1000 articles in national magazines and newspapers.
37. See RonHE, supra note 33, at 51-112, 138-60; WOLF, supra note 34, at 135-42,
191-97.
38. For purposes of this discussion, I deal with both of these books together,
although there are differences between them. Katie Roiphe's book is anecdotal, based
on her experiences as a Harvard undergraduate and Princeton graduate student, and is
clearly written from the vantage point of an observer of the women's movement. Naomi
Wolf writes as a feminist, and sees her book as a manual for feminist work in the
nineties. However, both fall into similar traps of simplifying themes of victimization and
agency in feminism and seeing them as opposites. See RoiPHE, supra note 33, at 29-50;
WOLF, supra note 34, at 135-42, 305-21.
39. See RoipHm, supra note 33, at 29-50, 85-112; WOLF, supra note 34, at 149,
185.
40. See RonPHE, supra note 33, at 51-112; WOLF, supra note 34, at 135-42, 180-
214.
41. See ROIPHE, supra note 33, at 29-50, 85-112; WOLF, supra note 34, at 135-42,
161-79.
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Debates within feminism about pornography reveal a similar
vacillation. For MacKinnon and other "porn-suppression" feminists,42
"sexuality is a realm of unremitting, unequalled victimization for women.
Pornography appears as the monster that made this so."' Yet,
"[fleminist theorists have also argued that the sexual terrain, however
power-laden, is actively contested. Women are agents, and not merely
victims, who make decisions and act on them, and who desire, seek out,
and enjoy sexuality.""
There are several problems with this dichotomy between victimization
and agency, and the historic vacillation between these theories in
feminism. First, the conception of both victimization and agency is too
narrow and incomplete. Second, victimization and agency are not extremes
in opposition; they are interrelated dimensions of women's experience.
Women's victimization is a real dimension of women's subordination.
But as Martha Minow has recently suggested, victimization claims are
both deeply embedded in our culture and inevitably contradictory.' On
the one hand, victimization claims make powerful appeals for sympathy,
solidarity, compassion, and attention.' On the other hand, claims of
victimization can be interpreted as attempts to avoid responsibility, to
suppress the societal and structural dimensions of discrimination, to
emphasize a fixed and limited sense of identity, and to undermine the
strength and capacity of individuals.47 I suggest that although
victimization claims may always be problematic, and are viewed with
great social ambivalence, these contradictions are particularly profound in
the area of gender. Victim claims for women trigger deep stereotypical
assumptions of passivity, purity, and protectiveness, as well as deep
resentment. Concepts of agency are also limited and problematic.
Traditional views of agency are based on notions of individual choice and
responsibility, individual will and action: perceptions of a world composed
42. Carlin Meyer uses the term "porn-suppression" feminists. See Meyer, supra
note 26, at 1097 & n.3.
43. Duggan et al., supra note 26, at 162.
44. Id. at 162-63.
45. Martha Minow, Surviving Vitbn Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411,1430-31 (1993)
(describing how victim claims present a series of dilemmas).
46. Id. at 1415 (describing some attractions of claims of victimhood as "obtaining
sympathy, relieving responsibility, finding solidarity, cultivating emotions of compassion,
and securing attention").
47. Id. at 1429.
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of atomized individuals, acting alone, unconstrained by social forces,
unmediated by social structures and systemic hardship.'
Women's victimization and agency are each understood to exist as the
absence of the other-as if one must be either pure victim or pure
agent-when in fact they are profoundly interrelated.49 Neither
victimization nor agency should be glorified, understood as static, viewed
in isolation or perceived as an individual or personal issue, for gender
subordination must be understood as a systemic and collective
problem-one in which women experience both oppression and
resistance.' Indeed, Martha Fineman has suggested that, because of the
influence of the "dominance" strand of feminist theory which has
emphasized women's sexual subordination and minimized systemic
problems such as economic discrimination, single motherhood, and
48. Mahoney, supra note 18, at 1314. Recognition of the mass appeal of the
language of agency and "power feminism" can be seen in the National Rifle
Association's effort to sell guns to women with advertisements telling women "how to
choose to refuse to be a victim." See Ms.-Is This Power Feminism? The Push to Get
Women Hooked on Guns, Ms., May/June 1994 (special edition-cover story); see also
Melinda Henmeberger, The Small-Arms Industry Comes on to Women, N.Y. Tmms, Oct.
24, 1993, §4, at 4 (reporting on charges made by women's groups that the NRA's
messageincreases the risk of violence against women and cynically appropriates feminist
language); Ann Jones,Living With Guns Playing With Fire, Ms., May/June 1994, at 38;
Ellen Neuborne, Cashing in on Fear: The NRA Targets Women, Ms., May/June 1994,
at 46.
49. Martha Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women's Lives, Violence and
Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLEN CE (Martha Albertson Fineman &
Roxanne MyKitiuk eds., forthcoming 1994). Mahoney is critical of "prevailing social
and legal concepts of agency." She says,
In our society, agency and victimization are each known by the absence of the
other; you are an agent if you are not a victim, and you are a victim if you are
in no way an agent. In this concept, agency does not mean acting for oneself
under conditions of oppression; it means being without oppression, either
having ended oppression or never having experienced it at all. This all-agent
or all-victim conceptual dichotomy will not be easy to escape or transform.
Id. See also Abrams, supra note 1, at 1552-56.
50. Dorothy Roberts has recently explored the idea of resistance to oppression and
detailed the development of "resistance theory that restores the critical return of human
agency, while recognizing the constraints of structure." Dorothy E. Roberts, Deviance,
Resistance andLove, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 179, 182-83. Resistance theory examines the
way in which individuals accommodate, mediate and resist dominating social practices;
for individual oppositional actions "reflect the broader dialectical relationship between
social structure and human agency." Id. at 183.
[Vol. 38
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welfare, there is an overly personal, individual and "self-help" dimension
to this recent resurgence of victimization/agency rhetoric. 1
Feminist work should reject these extremes and should instead explore
the interrelationship between, and simultaneity of, oppression and
resistance. I urge a more textured and contextual analysis of the
interrelationship between women's oppression and acts of resistance in a
wider range of women's circumstances. We must seek to understand both
the social context of women's oppression, which shapes women's choices
and constrains women's agency and resistance, and also recognize
women's agency and resistance in a more nuanced way. This means that
we reject simple dichotomies, give up either/ors, learn to accept
contradiction, ambiguity, and ambivalence in women's lives, and explore
more "grays" in our conceptions of women's experience, rather than
seeing only "blacks" and "whites." We should try to capture this more
honestly in the feminist legal theory and legal practice that we develop.
There are promising examples of these efforts in recent feminist
scholarship, work which provides. a fuller, richer picture of the
simultaneity of oppression and resistance and gives a deeper and more
textured meaning to the concept of women's agency. For example,
Angela Harris has analyzed the insufficiency of the victim/agency
dichotomy for women of color.52 Martha Mahoney has explored the
interrelationship between oppression and resistance for battered women,
and has examined the concept of exit in battering and sexual harassment
as an example of the limited notion of agency.' Dorothy Roberts' work
51. Martha Fineman emphasized this point in her presentation at the panel on
"Victim Feminism" at the Law and Society 1994 Annual Meeting. The Feminism and
Legal Theory Workshop at Columbia Law School that Fineman organized in June 1994
was entitled "Direction and Distortion: The Centrality of Sexuality in the Shaping of
Feminist Legal Theory." One of the themes that emerged at the Workshop was the way
in which feminist theoretical focus on sexuality as an issue had given a more personal
and individual cast to recent feminist work. Even issues such as sexual harassment have
been understood much more as sexual (individual), rather than workplace (collective).
See Carlin Meyer, Sexuality and the Workplace (June 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author). See also Katha Pollitt, Subject to Debate, NATION, Feb. 21, 1994, at
224 (describing "victim feminism" as a class phenomenon).
52. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. RnV. 581, 601 (1990). Angela Harris challenges the essentialism of Catharine
MacKinnon's work, and "dominance theory" generally; she suggests that "[b] lack women
have simultaneously acknowledged their own victimization and the victimization of black
men by a system that has consistently ignored violence against women by perpetrating
it against men." Id.
53. Martha Mahoney's work explores this interrelationship in a number of different
contexts. See Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea ofLeaving in Love, Work
and the Confirmation Hearings, supra note 18; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
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on motherhood and crime details the meaning of both oppression and
resistance,' and Kathryn Abrams has examined these issues in a number
of different contexts. 55
Feminist struggles on the issue of pornography must be understood in
this larger framework. A more textured perspective on the
interrelationship between victimization and agency means that we
understand that sexual images of women may have many different
meanings that reflect both women's oppression and women's resistance.
Although women are not merely sexual victims, women's assertion of
sexual pleasure and agency is complex because women's sexuality is
shaped by women's experiences of rape, sexual harassment and abuse, and
severe limits on reproductive freedom. In the pornography context, there
is tension between the recognition that coercion extends beyond traditional
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991); Martha
R. Mahoney, Victibnization or Oppression?, supra note 49; Martha R. Mahoney,
Whiteness and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5
YALE J.L. & FEMINM 217 (1993).
54. Dorothy Roberts has explored these issues of oppression and resistance in a
number of contexts primarily relating to motherhood. See Dorothy E. Roberts,
Deviance, Resistance and Love, supra note 50; Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and
Crime, 79 IowA L. REV. 95 (1993); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. Rnv.
1419 (1991).
55. Kathryn Abrams' work has consistently emphasized these contradictions. See
Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REv. 761, 795 (1990)
(suggesting that rather than attempting to explain women's actions as stemming from
either victimization or agency, feminists should "explore multi-causal explanations of
controversial choices made by women"). In her insightful review of Katie Roiphe's
book, which discusses the victimization and agency dichotomy, Abrams addresses the
need for feminists "to integrate the more complex accounts of human nature and agency
that have informed recent theoretical discussions into popular and legal debates."
Abrams, supra note 1, at 1556.
Although this task is only now in its inception, it is possible to sketch its
general outlines. It will require, first, mobilizing the appropriate imagery in
describing the lives of women. Contradiction and complexity, shifting
combinations of choice and restriction, will need to be depicted in concrete
terms that a range of audiences can understand. This task will also require
interpretive framework that emphasizes that such complex, constrained images
are not exceptional or pathological: though the particular constraints may be
specific to the circumstances of a group, the distance from a condition of
unencumbered autonomy is more widely shared. Finally, feminists will need
to address the features of the legal world that make accounts of partially
compromised autonomy, or complex, divided identities difficult to
accommodate or comprehend.
Id. at 1556-57 (citations omitted).
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liberal concepts of choice and the desire to grant women a sense of
empowerment and agency to make choices. Feminists have finally begun
to explore the varied dimensions of women's sexual agency and pleasure
under constraints of sexual oppression. At such a moment, we should not
fall back on familiar and tired characterizations that do not capture the
richness and complexity of this struggle. Sexual images, like sexuality
itself, may simultaneously be a source of women's experiences of
victimization and oppression, and a site of women's agency and
resistance.' If we examine both of these dimensions simultaneously, our
work will be more meaningful, and will be more grounded in, and more
reflective of, the experiences of women's lives.
56. See generally PLEASURh AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALIrY, supra
note 26; BAD GRLS AND DIRTY PICTURES: THE CHALLENGE TO RECLAIM FEMINSM
(Alison Assiter & Avedon Carol eds., 1993); SEX EXPOSED: SEXUALITY AND THE
PORNOGRAPi DEBATE (Lynne Segal & Mary McIntosh eds., 1993); see also Celia
Barbour, Looking at Pictures, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 1994, at 25 (arguing that women
deserve to create their own sexuality, and a "pornography of their own" might help).
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